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Abstract 
This paper explores the status of performance information in a local political setting. The NPM 
discourse assigns a new steering role to politicians as strategic decision makers. Logically, this should 
lead to an increased use of performance information. However, we notice that this is not automatically 
the case. There is a discrepancy between the intended and the actual use of performance information. 
Some explanation might be found in the fact that political and economic rationality generate divergent 
objectives. Politicians have a different perspective on performance information than the one implied in 
the New Public Management (NPM) model.  
We attempt to set a state of the art of performance information use by local politicians within the 
municipal council. The research builds on empirical findings regarding the reference to performance 
information in the political debate and attempts to evidence the presupposed patterns of use. The 
institutional framework is used in searching answers for the discrepancy between intended and actual 
use of performance related documents. Institutional theory and ter Bogt’s and Van Helden’s 
framework for studying organizational change might provide a basis to explore and analyse the 
reasons for using NPM like instruments in public sector organizations (ter Bogt, 2008a: 217).  
Data are collected from the Flemish municipal councils' official reports, as we intend to study the use 
of performance information in a true political setting. We analyse the extent to which politicians refer to 
performance information during the councils’ meetings. An index construct makes archival data 
operational to our analysis. Previous research has simultaneously come to sceptical and optimistic 
conclusions about the acceptance and use of performance information by local politicians. Our 
preliminary findings suggest an important variety in the reference to performance information during 
the councils' debate. 
1. Introduction 
Efficiency driven managerial reforms dominate the political agenda and practice throughout Europe 
(Steyvers et al 435). The contemporary logic of organizing in western local government has been 
referred to as New Public Management (NPM). It is seen as the wave of restructuring that swamped 
governmental organizations with businesslike instruments and styles during the last two decades 
(Hood 1991, 1995, Windels 2007). Thus NPM is regarded as a toolbox from which individual tools are 
taken to solve current problems. The great difference between old administration and NPM is that the 
ingredients of this toolbox for practical solutions have changed from regulations and input-oriented 
control to incentives and output or outcome-oriented control (Schedler: 547).  
NPM restructurings also encompass political institutions and ways of organizing politics and public 
decision- and policymaking. The ongoing modernization efforts are not just about public 
administration, it is the political and democratic constitution that is being reorganized under the guiding 
principles of NPM (Hansen: 105-106). There is no ‘one’ single model of NPM at play. Various NPM 
elements are stressed and combined in more or less specific ways, according to existing institutional 
structures and traditions of the countries in question. At the Flemish local government level a specific 
NPM model has been instituted. It attributes a set of new governing roles to the political and 
administrative actors, including a new role for local politicians. 
2. Focus on performance information 
One of the few undisputed facts about NPM is that it has significantly enhanced governments’ 
exposure to performance information (Askim 2007, Yetano 2009). Terms such as ‘privatization’, 
‘agentification’, ‘contractualization’, ‘continuous quality improvement’, ‘efficiency gains’, ‘activity 
costing’ and ‘performance management’ are part of the new lexicon. Much more than in the past, 
different stakeholders emphasize the importance of the performance of government organizations, 
transparency with regard to performance and their costs, as well as efficiency and effectiveness in 
general. Its primary claims are doing more for less as a result of better quality management, or -using 
the consultant’s vocabulary- to contribute to efficient, effective and customer oriented government 
(Van Helden, ter Bogt 2001). In tandem with NPM, it is suggested that new performance and control 
structures put a greater emphasis on accountability in terms of results which should contribute to a 
more effective and citizen-oriented government (Hood 1995).  
A usage gap 
“The gap between rhetorics and actions is so wide to provoke scepticism or, according to 
taste, cynicism (Pollitt & Bouckaert)”.  
The existence of performance information suggests a global shift in the direction of modern 
management. Many governmental documents and speeches have claimed a shift towards the use of 
performance information while closer empirical study showed that there had actually been high 
continuity between the old and the new (Pollitt & Bouckaert). Therefore, there are many sceptics 
among academics, politicians and managers who consider that the advantages claimed for 
performance measurement and use cannot be realized due to the complexity of local government 
(Yetano 2009:167). Particularly with respect to local government, the extent to which performance 
information has taken hold in a meaningful way could still be an open question (Poister & Streib: 325).  
Performance measurement is the usage of quantitative indicators to regularly measure the results and 
efficiency of public programs that clients, customers, or stakeholders expect (Tat-Kei Ho: 217). 
Indeed, it is not an end in itself. So why should politicians use performance information? According to 
Behn (2003) they may find the information helpful in achieving eight specific purposes: to evaluate, 
control, budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, learn and to improve. This list could be longer of 
shorter. Indeed, the only real purpose is to improve performance, the other seven purposes are simply 
means for achieving this ultimate purpose (Behn: 586-588).  
Utilization of performance information is composed of at least two stages, adoption and 
implementation. Adoption, understood in terms of a capacity to act, refers to the development of 
measures of outputs, outcomes and efficiency. Implementation, in terms of knowledge converted into 
action, refers to the actual use of performance measures for strategic planning, resources allocation, 
program management, monitoring, evaluation and reporting to internal management, elected officials, 
citizens or the media (de Lancer Julnes). De Lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) concluded that the two 
stages of utilization were differently influenced by a number of factors. Adoption was more heavily 
influenced by rational/technocratic factors. Implementation, on the other hand, was more influenced by 
political/cultural factors such as external interest groups.  
Politicians' perception of performance information 
The aforementioned changes in the public sector led to the development of large numbers of private 
sector techniques to measure and improve performance. However, in a public entity, success in a 
change process is conditioned by the support of the political class. Local governments are political 
entities, so decision-making is going to be highly influenced by the politicians. In fact, their 
commitment legitimates the reforms and helps to ensure funding for the reform (Yetano 2009). The 
new performance information should enable them to measure and to evaluate the performance of 
public entities and also increases the opportunities to account for performance (Van Thiel & Leeuw: 
268). However, a critical factor that is linked to many of these assumptions but that is often overlooked 
by researchers is elected officials' perceptions of the tool (Tat-Kei Ho: 219). Past studies suggest that 
concern for the political consequences of performance information can be a major barrier to the 
adoption of performance instruments. For example, if they believe that the tool can be politicized and 
cause problems in elections, or if they are concerned about possible negative media coverage of 
performance measurement results or the politicized atmosphere in which citizens or community 
groups often challenge the city council’s decisions, they are less likely to view it positively in the 
decision-making process (Tat-Kei Ho: 226).  
Moreover, political support will be highly influenced by political cycles focused on the short term. 
Elected representatives are usually more concerned with their own position than with organizational 
performance (Yetano 2009). So, before we can investigate local politicians' use of performance 
information we need to set a clear picture of the position of performance information in municipal 
councils. Elected representatives' support and participation gives “political weight” to the tool and plays 
an important role in integrating performance measurement in decision-making. Consequently, they will 
have to accept the needs and benefits of the NPM concept and support its implementation. Also, 
enthusiasm of city council members and city administrators about performance measurement should 
reinforce the value of the tool in decision-making (Tat-Kei Ho). 
Therefore, NPM inspired reforms tried to find ways to get politicians to think and act in a new mode so 
that the effect-oriented public management could be implemented with full coverage of the entire 
administration. Indeed, local politicians have to be willing to modify their perspective on control and 
support its processes of decision-making with rational, objective and focused information (Windels 
2007). After all, to succeed NPM reforms have to get their message across to the political world in a 
way that its members would pick up the ball in their behaviour (Schedler: 536). Although politicians are 
repeatedly demanding efficiency increases from the administration, they do not seem to care about 
efficiency when it comes to concrete decisions. Nevertheless, they claim to be rational in their thinking 
and behaving (Schedler: 538).  
3. New roles for politicians 
Within the NPM discourse the close political interference of public administration was criticized. The 
combination of overload by detailed matters and increasing sector orientation attracted growing 
criticism of local councillors, who were accused of playing case workers and administrators, leaving 
important political issues to professional administrators who were in turn, accused of playing 
politicians. Separation between the political and the bureaucratic part of government was deemed 
necessary assuming that both factors play a fundamentally different role in the furnishing of public 
services. According to the NPM discourse, these two kinds of ‘political’ and ‘administrative’ decision- 
making and -roles must not be mixed (Hansen). While politicians define the main objectives and 
provide democratic supervision, administrators execute and implement policy within this framework. 
‘Politics’ and ‘political’ decision making are seen, on the one hand, as the making of overall goals and 
objects for the general development and the various public services and tasks of the municipality. On 
the other hand, ‘administration’ and ‘administrative’ decision making are considered as operational 
management and running of concrete service provision and task performance in accordance with the 
political goals of the elected councillors. Moreover, delegating management and operational 
competence to the civil servants would simultaneously give the elected politicians more time and 
opportunities to do what they are good at and elected to do, namely make politics and policy. As a 
consequence, local politicians have significant new responsibilities (Steyvers et al: 433).  
Is efficiency outbalancing democracy as the prime value in municipalities?   
Some identify 'its lack of understanding for political processes and things 'political' as the most 
fundamental problem of the new managerialism. The unpredictable nature of democratic decision-
making and its sensitivity to changing political pressure are criticised as irrational and inefficient from 
this management logic. The municipalities are, indeed, democratic political institutions, organizing 
public and common services for the citizens of the municipality. Politicians are the elected 
representatives of the plurality of opinions and interests of the citizens. They carefully watch the 
common concerns and affairs of the municipality. Their role is to comprehend a subject matter from 
different points of view, to consider it, to compromise conflicting interests and judge what is most 
reasonable and appropriate in a given situation. This genuine political and democratic dimension of 
the role and skills of elected councillors is not easily combined with the propagated role of goal-
steering (Hansen).  
The emphasis on economic efficiency upheld in NPM trends to produce the conception of a clean and 
apolitical self-government. However, historically and constitutionally such a distinction and separation 
of political vs administrative competence and decision making was not instituted as part of local 
government structure. The local council has, as an elected assembly of representatives and 
ombudsmen of the citizens, always been granted complete political as well as administrative 
competence and responsibility to handle local affairs (Steyvers et al.). The study of Steyvers et al 
(2006:438) showed that more than half of the mayors (fully) disagreed with the idea that politicians 
should define objectives and control output but never intervene in the task fulfilment of the local 
administration. Support for this role distinction among Belgian mayors thus seems rather limited. They 
support a more classic approach of governmental organization. 
Steering instead of rowing 
According to the NPM model politicians have an important assignment as strategists and opinion 
leaders. They have been attributed a new role as general goal steering decision-makers, formulating 
and deciding overall goals and specific project as well as the financial frames of the municipality. NPM 
underlines that politicians should stick to their core business, which is developing new policies to 
realize political goals (Van Thiel & Leeuw: 277).  
However, this distinction between the administrative and the political field might have some 
unintended consequences. An interpretation of NPM that is targeted solely at the throughput and 
output might limit the power of politics (Steyvers et al 434). If NPM reduced political discussions to a 
‘strategic’ set of targets, it would generate serious problems for politicians. NPM would then become 
senseless for political rationality (Schedler: 540). As a result of the NPM separation of politics and 
administration, local councillors could lose touch with real life in the task-performing and service-
delivering municipal institutions. Because of weak contact and missing information and knowledge 
about what is going on at institution and user level, it becomes difficult for local councillors to relate 
their goal-steering efforts to real-life problems of users. Therefore, various efforts to concretize and 
operationalize the overall goals, in order to render goal making and steering more politically 
meaningful, were made. Various types of performance related documents were produced to enhance 
the control, scrutiny and outcome oriented focus of elected representatives. Ideally, they would 
enhance the communication of visions and the choice of appropriate strategies based upon 
performance information. 
Moreover, as NPM reforms and more specifically the new role distinction may lead to a (perceived ?) 
loss of power and increased distance to the operational field, it is expected that performance 
documents would provide the necessary information to perform their new role as strategic leaders. It 
might also strengthen their position in the council compared to less informed colleagues.  
Reforms in The Netherlands appear to have been successful in strengthening councillors’ focus on 
their control and scrutiny functions (De Groot et al: 148). This is more or less in line with similar 
experiences in the UK where evaluations also indicate that the recent Local Government Act (LGA) 
reforms have also resulted in some modest changes in the role orientation of councillors. These 
results imply that claims that institutional reforms may not be a very promising strategy need to be 
nuanced. Even in a relatively short period of time Dutch reforms did have an effect. Nevertheless we 
should be cautious to generalize these findings.  
 
Competing rationalities: are politicians acting irrationally? 
NPM focuses on increasing the efficiency of governmental organizations by quantitatively relating 
output to input. It is widely assumed that the integration and use of performance information for all 
kinds of decision-making processes is “a good thing” (Pollitt & Bouckaert). In that sense NPM’s 
concept of efficiency is grounded in economics. However, this ‘economic efficiency’ is not the same as 
‘political efficiency’- a concept that focuses on the efforts needed to attract voters in elections (ter Bogt 
2004: 25). Therefore, many attempts to integrate performance information in political decision-making 
failed. The introduction of targets and the availability of performance reports hardly explain whether 
politicians use performance reports. Reformers complain that new public management instruments are 
not used properly by politicians. As a consequence, the lack of political interest in policy indicators is a 
frequent complaint of civil servants (Van Dooren 2004: 512). Could it be that economic logic and 
political logic do not come to the same conclusions? Political rationality, often dominating the public 
sector, calls for solutions to problems that are acute and must be treated as such while the NPM 
discourse stimulates long term strategic planning (Schedler). Maybe better information about expected 
results does not actually help much when politicians come to the point of having to make decisions 
(Pollitt & Bouckaert). To conclude, the mere existence of performance information does not, by itself, 
mean that information will be used (Moynihan & Ingraham: 11). 
4. Theoretical framework 
In the rational decision-making model, the role of performance information is rather straightforward: 
neat performance information contributes to the attainment of neatly defined organizational goals. 
However, the rational decision-making model fails to recognize that performance information might 
actually amplify ambiguity rather than reduce it. The use of performance information is therefore a 
quite diverse and multifaceted phenomenon (Van de Walle & Van Dooren: 3). Moreover, previous 
research has demonstrated that politicians do not behave in a rational manner (ter Bogt, 2004). 
A broad institutional model can offer a useful theoretical framework for studying managerial changes. 
When people use performance measurement systems, appropriate them, resist or politicize them, they 
are strongly influenced by the cultural conditions of their working environment (Vakkuri & Meklin 
2003). An institutional framework combines economic, social, political, historical and cultural 
dimensions in the analysis of organizations and change processes (ter Bogt 2008a: 210).  
The difficulty to investigate the use of performance measurement may be due to the multifaceted 
nature of local government. Expectations, values and rules from inside and outside the organization 
also play a part in the decision to introduce changes. Institutional theory emphasizes the influence of 
structures in society and the social and cultural aspects of an organization’s environment, such as 
rules, power, interests and habits in a particular group or society (ter Bogt 2008a: 210). The field study 
of Van Helden and ter Bogt (2001) shows that the impact of instrumental innovations similar to NPM 
can be evaluated by addressing various organizational and behavioural perspectives. Moreover, 
institutional theory not only focuses on organizations, but also on the individuals within organizations 
(ter Bogt 2008a: 214).  
Rules, routines and institutions 
The NPM model suggests that the most important explanation for changing the control of government 
organizations is the desire to improve performance, i.e. to increase economic efficiency and 
effectiveness. However, not all authors are convinced that organizational changes are mainly intended 
to increase economic efficiency and effectiveness. Burns and Scapens (2000) developed a model for 
conceptualizing management accounting change based on institutional theory and old institutional 
economics. The model is useful to this research because it focuses on routines and practices in 
organizations. Rules, routines and institutions are three interrelated concepts which mutual 
relationship explains organizational change. We can consider the legislative framework as the formal 
rules, the actual practices as routines. Institutions are the organizational culture and the broader 
environment in which local government operates. Effective political institutions are those that are lived 
by political actors (Lowndes & Leach: 561). They shape political behaviour by providing a relatively 
systematic and stable set of opportunities and constraints (Lowndes & Leach: 560). First, political 
institutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate action. Second, 
political institutions not only respond to their environment but also create these environments at the 
same time. Third, political institutions evolve trough history-dependent intertwining of stability and 
change. (Bolton & Fleming: 727). Changing institutions is the most powerful weapon in the reformer's 
arsenal. To change political institutions is to alter actors' sense of what is possible and impossible, 
desirable and undesirable. But institutional change -as opposed to organizational restructuring- is hard 
to achieve. Changes in institutional rules are unlikely to have mayor effects if key actors are unwilling 
or unable to abide by the reforms. Some authors have argued that institutional reforms ‘may not be a 
very promising strategy’ because ‘it is difficult to achieve, its outcomes hard to predict’ and if there are 
any effects these ‘are likely to be realized only in the longer term’. Others warned that ‘designers of 
institutions are often writing on water’. Therefore, some proclaim that the proposition that institutional 
reforms will alter people’s attitudes and behaviour ‘is an hypothesis, not an axiom” (De Groot et al: 
404). This research precisely tests the hypothesis that an institutional reform, generating new roles for 
local politicians, would lead to an enhanced control and efficiency oriented focus of local 
representatives. Consequently, they would make increased use of the available performance 
information to accomplish this new assignment.  
However, the relationships between rules, routines and institutions are much less clear. The difference 
between routines (which are embedded in institutions) and rules highlights the gap between actual 
and formal change, which is the primary focus of this research (ter Bogt, Van Helden 2000: 270). 
Burns and Scapens only deal vaguely with the causes and effects and mechanisms of accounting 
change. Other models, such as Shields and Young’s Seven C’s model and Cyert and March’s general 
theory about information processing, decision-making and learning in organizations, throw some light 
on the circumstances under which the use of performance information might alter (ter Bogt, Van 
Helden 2000:272). According to Shields and Young, the success of the introduction of a new 
management instruments depends primarily on an organization’s ability to focus on behavioural rather 
than technical issues. The use of new performance related documents can be facilitated by focusing 
on seven general behavioural and organizational issues: culture, champion, change process through 
commitment, compensation, controls and continuous education. 
Figure 1 
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An exploration of Cyert and March’s ideas within the context of accounting change leads to the 
following observation: if the participants in an organization are satisfied with the existing rules, there 
will be no incentive to change. This implies that external or internal pressure is a prerequisite for the 
alteration of rules. Furthermore participants, in our case local politicians, will be inclined to repeat 
behaviour and also the underlying rules if this is seen to be successful.    
To summarize, ter Bogt’s and Van Helden’s framework encompasses a combination of elements from 
the three approaches. Therefore, our approach is based on the following inputs: firstly, Burns' and 
Scapens’ distinction between rules and routines to explain the difference between formal and actual 
change, secondly, pressure or lack of pressure for change related to the ideas of Cyert and March. 
Thirdly, the relevant internal enablers for success of change for which Shield’s and Young’s model 
provides promising clues (ter Bogt, Van Helden 2000: 273). Of course, this is a dynamic process with 
different interacting elements. Figure 2 illustrates the application of the framework on this research. 
The formal introduction of new NPM-like instruments mostly takes place during a well defined 
beginning and end. After the formal introduction, the real use takes place and the new instruments are 
used and adjusted. 
 
 
Culture 
Champion 
Change process: 
- Commitment 
- Compensation 
- Controls 
- Continuous education 
Social, economic, 
political, historical, 
organisational  
context 
"institutions" 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Culture 
Champion 
Commitment 
Control 
Change process 
Continuous education 
Compensation 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION 
 
 
 
USE BY POLITICIANS 
 
PRACTICES 
"routines" 
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
 
NPM ideas/Municipal Decree 
"rules" 
NPM model 
/intended use 
* Economic<=> political rationality 
* NPM <=> political perspective 
 
EXTERNAL PRESSURE TO CHANGE 
5. Research Question 
The NPM literature has generally focused on the expected effects of reforms but attempts at studying 
the consequences of such reforms have often found unintended results and significant gaps between 
expected and actual changes (Anessi-Pessina, Nasi & Steccolini: 321). Previous research (Van 
Helden, ter Bogt 2001: 83) showed that NPM developments cannot be fruitfully described or explained 
by only focusing on the availability of new instruments. What really matters is how these instruments 
are applied in practice. Besides, international literature questions the effectiveness of new financial 
instruments. An important gap exists between the ideal concept of management change and the 
development in daily use of various NPM instruments. Arguing that substantial attention has already 
been devoted to the ideological and instrumental aspects of reform adoption, nowadays many 
researchers are shifting their focus to the actual practices, the impacts and the outcomes of the 
implemented programmes (Windels 2007).  
A weak spot in research 
Our knowledge about whether and how politicians use performance information is limited by a lack of 
empirical evidence. While the link between performance measurement and the use of this information 
in decision-making is often assumed, actual use is usually the weak spot in performance information 
systems (Van de Walle & Van Dooren: 2). When summing up 20 years of research, Pollitt calls it 
mildly amazing that there are only few analyses of what elected politicians do with performance 
information. There has been some theorizing about elected politicians’ utilization of performance 
information, but the implications of this theorizing are not sufficiently tested (Askim 2007:454). The 
majority of the literature concerning private and public accounting and reporting deals with concepts 
and instruments (Grossi, Reichard). Several of these studies have addressed the more “technical” 
aspects of performance measurement in government organizations (e.g. what should be measured 
and how, what is measured?). Subsequently, a lot of research has been conducted into promises, 
usefulness and potential of performance measures and indicators such as the Balanced Score Card 
model.  
More recent studies focused on the factors that contribute to the usage of performance measures 
(Tat-Kei Ho: 220) and stakeholder needs regarding performance reporting in local authorities (Tooley 
et al.). They mainly cover managers’ experience (for example Lee), and it is not evident that findings 
concerning managerial use are applicable to the political sphere as politicians and managers conduct 
their work in very different ways. Moreover, how performance information is integrated into decision 
making remains a “black box” and is often disregarded by researchers (Tat-Kei Ho: 234).  
Most evidence on politicians’ utilization of performance information is still rather anecdotal and stems 
from case studies and surveys. They have provided valuable insight and interesting hypotheses but 
little systematic evidence of levels and patterns of use (Askim 2007:456). Although the use of self-
reporting surveys has been a widely adopted methodology in many previous studies on performance 
information, its reliability depends heavily on the respondents’ correct understanding and subjective 
interpretation of the questions (Tat-Kei Ho: 221). Indeed, surveys and interviews can be employed to 
investigate these issues, but any results obtained must be viewed with caution since self-reports 
frequently do not correspond to the actual use of information (Schiff & Hoffman: 135). Furthermore, 
these studies often probe intentions or opinions concerning performance information use and 
measuring attitudes does not necessarily tell us something about actual behaviour (Steyvers et al: 
436). Compared to documentary analysis, the exaggerated claims of officials responding to surveys 
may overestimate the actual use of performance measures in municipal government (Poister & Streib: 
328). Thus, it might be stated that the findings of survey responses may still overstate the use and 
usefulness of performance measurement in actual practice (Poister & Streib: 332). 
Other studies described the type of information politicians prefer or their use during the various stages 
of decision making processes (ter Bogt 2004, Melkers & Willoughby). The purpose of the use, for 
example to evaluate managers or civil servants, has also been investigated (ter Bogt 2003). Moreover, 
common to almost all previous research, is the emphasis on one type of politician: on the one hand 
top echelon politicians such as majors and aldermen and on the other hand ‘ordinary' councillors. 
Therefore, we will consider the municipal council as an entire entity. 
This literature review has clearly demonstrated that local politicians' perception, self-evaluation and 
intentions have already been investigated from different angles but we wonder what happens with 
performance information when they act in the political arena. As a consequence, this paper will look 
deeper into the real actions of local politicians in the municipal council.  
A state of the art 
This paper will set a state of the art on the current status of performance information in municipal 
councils. We will analyze the extent to which performance information becomes the tool through which 
organisational performance is understood (Yetano 2010). 
The actual status of performance information in municipal councils only exists through the actions of 
the individual members of the council (Lowndes & Leach). When policy makers say they 'don't use' 
performance information, what does this actually mean? Does it mean they generally do not sit down 
with a 200-page performance report and a cup of tea? This is quite likely (Van de Walle & Van 
Dooren: 3). Likewise, the conclusion of the (all in all, scarce) research on how politicians use 
performance information appears to be that they prefer rich verbal information above detailed written 
information (ter Bogt 2004). Indeed, a consideration of the term 'use' limited to reading complex 
quantitative data would be very restrictive. The use of performance documents is probably less 
formalized than the existence of performance reports suggests. Rare are the cases where a single 
discrete decision can be traced back to a well defined set of performance indicators (Van de Walle & 
Van Dooren: 4-5). Specifically, while performance measures do not drive decisions is some automatic, 
mechanical way, they often form the basis for discussions that may afterwards lead to decisions. 
Previous research noted that what we may really see is a less direct use of performance 
measurement. In fact, performance measurement may have little direct impact on decision-making 
and still be of value in ‘enlightening’ various stakeholders (de Lancer Julnes, 2006: 224). 
Therefore, performance information may not directly drive decisions but somehow influences action. If 
the effectiveness of performance measures was judged in terms of its direct use in decision-making, 
the conclusion would be that performance measurement does not have an impact on management. 
However, this interpretation would miss the more subtle, although still valuable, impacts of 
performance measures (De lancer Julnes 2006: 227).  
Using performance measurement information to inform dialogue among decision makers should thus 
be considered as a positive contribution (de Lancer Julnes 2008: 59). Therefore, this paper focuses on 
the reference to any type of performance information during the political debate in the municipal 
council. Exactly because of the subtle and indirect impact on discussion, we will apply a broad 
definition of the term ‘performance information’, not limited to financial or quantitative information. For 
this purpose, an index construct defining performance information is being completed at present. Most 
references containing an evaluation or performance related component will thus be included in our 
analysis. We do not investigate which type of information local politicians use or their sources. What 
matters to our research is if they refer to it during debate, as we assume that this reference indicates a 
more NPM-like mindset of politicians. Our main research question could be formulated as follows: 
To what extent do local politicians refer to performance information in municipal councils' debate ?  
Is their use merely symbolic and a matter of rhetoric? How often do they mention performance 
information during the discussions ? Is their a difference between majority and opposition ? Do certain 
policy sectors generate more performance based discussions, … and so on. These are a few 
questions that this paper aims to answer. 
6. Data Collection 
Belgium has 589 municipalities: 308 in the Flemish region, 262 in the Walloon region and 19 in the 
Brussels capital region. Each municipality has a council, whose members (7-55 in number) are directly 
elected for a six-year term. The council has the competence to decide on all matters of local interest. 
Among its members, the council elects between two and ten aldermen. They usually belong to the 
political (single-party or coalition) majority in the council. Finally, the major, as chief executive of the 
municipality is appointed for a six year term. The major and the aldermen together could be 
considered as the executive board of the municipality (Ackaert: 168-169).  
A 'wind of change' is gently blowing through the localities in Belgium. The recent regionalisation of the 
organic framework of municipalities seems to unlock new, although still reluctant, dynamics. The 
Municipal Decree of 20061 (in Dutch “Gemeentedecreet) introduced new instruments which enabled 
municipalities to organise themselves in a new modern way. Fitting in with the rise of NPM attention 
                                                 
1
 In Dutch: “Gemeentedecreet, Decreet van 15 juli 2005”, 30/04/2009 latest adjustment. 
 
was given to a more businesslike and professionalized management of local government. As 
illustrated in figure 3, the changes relate to aspects such as organisational culture, financial 
management, human resources and result oriented policy planning and evaluation. An openness 
towards forms of out-of-house production (autonomous municipal agencies, public private 
partnerships, …) is gradually emerging. The growing importance of public-private partnerships seems 
to suggest a willingness to include productive superiority within publicly anchored networks in certain 
policy domains. Internally the administrative organization seems to convert into a management body 
led by the municipal secretary. The introduction of budget-holding, a management team, modern 
financial management and delegation to administration suggests a base for a more horizontal power 
relationship and separation between politicians and administration. Most of the stipulations are 
compulsory, for example the establishment of a municipal management team, some are optional such 
as the implementation of budget ownership. The operation occurs in different phases. The Decree can 
thus be considered as the introduction of NPM in Flemish municipalities. Because of the mainly 
compulsory character of the Decree, the context in which Flemish municipalities operate is largely 
homogeneous. This focused empirical setting enhances a higher degree of comparability of empirical 
findings (de Buijn & van Helden: 410). 
Figure 3 : Main elements and objectives of the reform 
Political components - strengthening of the municipal council 
- focus on policy-making tasks of council 
Bureaucracy - preparation, implementation and evaluation of policy plans 
- collaboration model together with political field 
Human Resources - more legal possibilities for employment 
- employment of cabinet personnel 
- flexible recruitments 
Self regulation - internal and external privatization 
- more possibilities for private-public partnerships 
- implementation of audit 
Civilian participation - complaint management systems 
- increased involvement of civil society with policy making 
- procedure of turning in petitions 
Modern financial and 
policy instruments 
- strategic long-range plan 
- management team composed of civil servants and major 
- annual budgets with integrated financial and policy plans 
- adjusted role and function for treasurer and municipal 
manager 
- budget ownership for civil servants 
- internal control systems 
- flexible executive committee 
- external audit 
8. Data Analysis 
Pollitt developed a multi-layered concept of public sector reform consisting of four different stages. 
The first stage stands for the new managerial ‘discourse’, the relatively abstract ideas of running the 
public sector in a businesslike manner forming the conceptual agenda. The second stage contains the 
decisions of political executives and managers to develop and adopt new instruments. The third phase 
concerns the daily managerial activities and styles that embed the newly developed management 
instruments (Jansen 2008b). The fourth and last stage relates to the results of the reforms and their 
effect on customers and citizens (Windels 2007). 
This research refers to the second and third phase in Pollitt’s classification of NPM changes. Research 
concerning the third stage requires a more sophisticated approach than the first and the second ones. 
Often extensive field work, including survey and case or field studies will be necessary to investigate 
how techniques are used and also shed light on contextual and organisational factors that may 
influence the use of new techniques in actual practice. Consequently, a large majority of the papers 
simultaneously discusses reforms at the second and third NPM level, with case and field research as 
dominant research methods.  
Therefore, previous research concerning NPM changes in local government often used qualitative 
methods (for example Lapsley, Pallot, Van Helden, Jansen, Van Helden & ter Bogt 2001). They 
demonstrate the value of employing qualitative research strategies as a complement to strong 
quantitative methods focusing on explicit structures, practices and outcomes in advancing institutional 
theory (Dacin et al. :48). Quantitative research in which hypotheses are tested using econometric 
methods is obviously not mainstream, although there are some notable exceptions. This dominance of 
qualitative over quantitative NPM research seems to be similar to research traditions in UK public 
management (Van Helden, Jansen: 82-83).  
Our research approach requires the study of 'rules in use' as opposed to 'rules in practice'. Concretely, 
we want to separate the 'real actions' from the 'rhetoric' and to unearth the rules that shape political 
behaviour in the municipal councils. Consequently, we analyse documents that provide unrestrained 
information concerning the actual reference to performance information during the councils’ debate. 
The councils' official reports contain the essential material from which we can derive the desired 
evidence. The literal reproduction of the debates in the municipal council (or at least the main 
arguments) is often registered. That enables us to deduce the reference to performance information 
by politicians. The reports are ‘living sources’, containing sometimes animated political discussions. 
They observe the dynamics of city politics and show how performance information is referred to in 
municipal councils. 
Besides, they are a rich source of information since municipal orders on all policy areas are included 
together with the preceding discussions. All official performance, financial and management 
documents (annual budget and financial reports, long term policy plans, ...) must be discussed and 
approved by the council following the regulations of the new Municipal Decree. In this respect we will 
not conduct a kind of content analysis but we make a peculiar interpretation of the discussions held in 
the council. In some instances performance measurement information could give the appearance of 
rational decision-making when in reality the information has been distorted to support political goals 
(de Lancer Julnes 2006: 224). Although this is something we have to keep in mind, we are particularly 
interested is this specific political setting. The main research focus of this paper is not why they refer 
to performance information, but first of all, if they do it at all. 
Furthermore, these reports are official documents, publicly available for all 308 Flemish municipalities. 
Other relevant documents such as the reports of the municipal finance commission (composed by 
members of the local council) might be included as well. 
The analysis is certainly not intended as an evaluation of the implementation of the requirements of 
the decree in terms of success or failure. We do not evaluate compliance with legislative regulations, 
but we establish a neutral state of the art of the current status of performance information in municipal 
councils 
Therefore, we quantify the archival data available in the municipal council's official reports, based on a 
random sample of one fourth of the  308 municipalities. The reports for the year 2008 will be studied, 
testing them on an “index of performance information use”. The use of such an index enables us to 
convert qualitative information into quantitative data, which is a proper method to make the reference 
to  performance information operational to our research. Figure 3 illustrates some elements containing 
the index. We intend to come to a range of local entities varying from heavy performance minded 
municipalities to absolutely non-users.  
Figure 3: some elements containing the index 
Identification of the municipality -  size 
-  presence of alderman for financial affairs 
-  presence of separate municipal commission for 
finance 
-  single party in majority or coalition 
Properties of performance 
information 
- financial or non- financial information 
- personal opinion or objective 
- Source ? 
- concerning service delivery or other performance 
related items ? 
 
Who makes the reference ? -  major 
-  aldermen 
-  councillors (majority or opposition) 
-  chairman council  
9. Preliminary Findings 
Is there any evidence that accounting can influence political processes? Do politicians use 
performance information in order to perform their new steering role ? 
As this is only the very first stage of our empirical research, these preliminary results are based on a 
preparatory lecture of a few councils' reports. However, we can already make a few observations.  A 
first finding is that the reports are not an obvious documentary source for this kind of research, as they 
are written for other administrative purposes. It is a challenge to get hold of council reports where the 
complete discussion is noted. Very often only summarized easy readable versions with the most 
important decisions are published. This is of course not what we are interested in.  
Nevertheless, based on a small sample of already acquired reports, we notice a manifest variation in 
the status of performance information in municipal councils. Some local politicians definitely became 
the strategic, rational, well informed managers of their portfolio, using and referring to performance 
information, while others still behave in a very traditional politically fashionable way. In some councils 
there is never any reference to any type of performance information. Even the annual budget is 
approved without the slightest comment. In other municipalities every council meeting is interspersed 
with performance information based criticism from the opposition members. However, the dominant 
image will probably remain that of councils' meetings where there is only sporadically reference to 
performance information, although there are notable exceptions. Local politicians are still mainly 
concerned with not exceeding the budget which leads to essentially input based discussions. At first 
sight, there are no incontestable signs of a systematic more performance information based 
underpinning of discussions.  
It is too early to draw conclusions on the causes behind the exceptions (possible reasons might be the 
presence of strong opposition members, education and experience of council members,…). 
Politicians’ familiarity with performance information and their support for its use seem to be correlated 
with several organisational factors, such as municipalities' administrators’ attitude towards 
performance measurement, their integration in the decision-making process and the involvement of 
citizens (Tat-Kei Ho: 229). The linkage between performance measurement, strategic planning, goal 
setting, and public reporting will presumably turn out to be of overriding importance. 
10. Preliminary Conclusion 
Doctrines of NPM have been quite influential in shaping both the structures and processes in Flemish 
municipal councils. On the one hand, the NPM discourse has been articulated and interpreted within 
the existing institutional reality of Flemish local governments, and the managerial recommendations 
have been translated into that reality. On the other hand, this reality has been restructured and given 
form and coloured by the NPM discourse. Consequently, institutional reforms alone would not be 
enough to bring about the desired changes in local politicians’ roles leading to more performance 
information based underpinnings of municipal councils’ discussions.  
Maybe council members are satisfied with a less radical change because it fits their organisational 
culture better? Indeed we have to bear in mind that we do not yet have systematic empirical evidence 
at our disposal. Our first preliminary conclusions seem to correspond with the rather pessimistic and 
sceptical views of previous researchers, although the municipal decree did not bring any convergence 
in the use of performance information. Diversity prevails in the municipal councils, performance 
information is referred to (or not) in a very divergent way. That degree of diversity in the status of 
performance information demonstrates that the NPM discourse as proposed by the Flemish regional 
government is by no means decisive for local politicians' use of performance information. The NPM- 
based input is rather homogeneous, the outcome, however, is mainly differentiated. 
In general, councillors seem not totally convinced to adapt their traditional working practices which had 
been installed for many years. They appear to still perform more rowing than steering tasks. New rules 
about how to manage municipalities according to a NPM inspired practice do not clearly impact upon 
their actual political behaviour. Most newly introduced performance information is probably considered 
as ‘nice to know’ and not as an incentive to realise any far-reaching change. After all, maybe we 
should conclude that there is a strong need for a more realistic model of the role politicians can and 
should play in the running of the state apparatus as Pollitt and Bouckaert suggest. In other words, a 
shift in mentality might be necessary before any form of performance information can be recognised 
as important and useful in municipal councils (Pollitt, Bouckaert: 147). 
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